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Abstract
Criminal investigation and prosecution of politicians, top civil servants and
other public gures are topics frequently discussed in the media. The nature
of the investigating or prosecuting authority varies between countries; from the
general public prosecutor, through magistrates to independent counsels or par-
liamentary investigation commissions. This paper analyzes the role and status
of public prosecutors within separation of powers-concept. Prosecutors are usu-
ally part of the executive and not the judicial branch, which implies that they do
not enjoy the same degree of independence as judges, and are ultimately subor-
dinated to the directives of the minister of justice or the government. Conicts
of interest may hence arise if members of government can use the criminal pro-
cess for their own or partisan interests. The incentives of public prosecutors in
dierent jurisdictions are compared.1
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The Prosecution of Public Figures and the Separation of Powers: Confusion
within the Executive Branch
1 Introduction
The rule of law and the separation of powers are celebrated as hallmarks of
Western legal and philosophical thought. They are supposed to guarantee
individual freedom and political equality. Separation of powers implies a
functional division of labor between the legislature, the executive and the
judiciary. This division is to be backed by an institutional separation with some
overlapping powers to check and balance the other branches in order to prevent
cartelization of government power (Brennan and Hamlin, 2000). Within this
framework one can portray the judiciary as having two main functions: (1) to
decide whether actions carried out by members of the other two branches are
within the legal frame or the rule of law, and (2) to adjudicate disputes between
individuals and to decide whether individuals ought to be sanctioned because they
violated the law. This paper focuses on the intersection of these two sub-
functions, namely criminal acts committed by members of the other branches of
government (including public figures who have strong connections to the
government).
In order to fulfill its role as the guardian of the rule of law, the judiciary has to be
independent from the other branches of government. An impressive body of
literature addresses normative and positive questions regarding the independence
of the judiciary. But the judiciary cannot initiate proceedings and decisions. This
feature is especially significant with regard to its role to sanction violations of the
law, as access to the courts is often a monopoly held by the prosecution
authorities. In most legal systems, the prosecution authorities are part of the
executive branch of government. Hence, specific problems are expected to arise
when members of the executive (or the legislature) commit the alleged crimes.
Our paper focuses on prosecution in such cases.
The notion of the separation of powers would seem to stipulate that crimes
committed by members of the government should be investigated and prosecuted
by persons that are not dependent on government personnel. The independence of
the judiciary is a key element in Western legal and philosophical thought, but the
independence of state prosecutors is rarely ever mentioned. In this paper, it is
argued that the independence of the judiciary can only be expected to unfold its
beneficial functions if the procuracy enjoys at least some degree of independence
from executive organs such as the minister of justice or the prime minister of a
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country, in a personal as well as in a functional respect.2 It is further argued that
the misuse of the procuracy can not only lead to higher levels of corruption but
can have far-reaching effects on the legitimacy of the democratic state as well as
on its stability.
The paper connects two strands in the economic analysis of law: the economic
analysis of crime and enforcement on the one hand, and the economics of
corruption, on the other. In the next section, these two strands are introduced and
some gaps that we intend to start filling are identified. Section three contains a
number of variables determining possibilities and incentives of prosecutors to
prosecute certain crimes. A hypothesis concerning the expected effects of the
respective institutional arrangements will be attached to every variable. In section
four, the possibility that the variables introduced in section 3 display interaction
effects on each other, is explicitly recognized by introducing “conditional
hypotheses”. Section five presents some preliminary conclusions but also some
ideas of how the outline developed in this paper could be put to an empirical test.
2 Literature Survey and Definition of the Key-Concepts
2.1 Corruption as Independent and Dependent Variable
Germany’s reputation as a country with a low degree of corruption and bribery
experienced a severe blow over the last couple of years. The party financing
scandal in which former chancellor Kohl was heavily involved and the sale of a
former state-owned refinery to French conglomerate Elf-Aquitaine are only the
two best-known examples. But Germany is not the only country in which crimes
committed by public figures have come to the fore. Similar cases can be quoted
with regard to many other governments, including member states of the OECD
such as France, Italy, and Japan, which has a reputation as a country with a high
degree of corrupt government officials. Corruption can manifest itself not only by
non-prosecuted crimes committed by public figures, but also by the way
politicians use the criminal system to their own advantage, such as fighting the
opposition.
                                                
2  With regard to de facto judicial independence, Feld and Voigt (2003) find that it positively
influences real GDP growth per capita in a sample of 57 countries.
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The possible consequences of crimes committed by government members and
other public figures have only recently attracted the attention of economists. Quite
generally, one can point at two avenues dealing with the topic. The major avenue
is the inquiry into the consequences of corruption, its impact on economic growth,
and on the legitimacy of government and the state as a whole (see, e.g., Mauro
1995). The other avenue is the inquiry into the possible incentives that induce
politicians to commit more or less crimes. In recent years, several papers have
dealt with the latter question. For example, based on a cross-national study using
two different data sets as a proxy for corruption, Ades and di Tella (1999) find
that countries in which firms enjoy higher rents suffer higher levels of corruption.
Additionally, the level of corruption was found to be higher, where domestic firms
are protected from foreign competition either by natural barriers or by politically
erected barriers to trade.
A broader approach is taken by Treisman (2000), who explains the level of
corruption as being determined by a host of variables. According to him, countries
with protestant traditions, countries that used to be ruled by the British, and
countries that enjoy a higher per capita income were less corrupt. Federal states
were, c.p., more corrupt. Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2001) find that lower
barriers to entry into the legislators’ market are correlated with less corruption,
whereas a larger proportion of candidates elected from party lists – rather than
directly – is connected with more corruption. Their explanation for the second
finding is that a lower degree of individual accountability of politicians vis-à-vis
their voters contributes to higher corruption.3 The authors believe that the effects
of the electoral system dominate over the effects attributed to the size of the
voting district. A focus on political institutions has recently also been chosen by
Golden and Chang (2001), who argue, somewhat in contrast to Persson, Tabellini
and Trebbi, that an intense amount of intra-party competition increases the
necessity of politicians to accept bribes in order to finance their election
campaigns within their respective parties. They claim to have evidence with
regard to Italy’s Democrazia Christiania in support of their hypothesis.
                                                
3  Persson, Tabbelini and Trebbi (2001) do not mention a crucial precondition for their results to
hold, namely that citizen-voters do not only care to have “corruption-free” politicians but that
corruption constitutes an issue important enough to determine voting behavior. They use the so-
called “Corruption Perception Index” developed by Transparency International as the left-hand
variable, which is somehow problematic, as this index is constructed on the bases of foreign experts
like investors. As long as they cannot vote, they shouldn’t enter into the index and it is not the
“perception” of corruption that ought to be inquired into but rather the “evaluation” or
“importance” that individual (and domestic) respondents to the survey attach to it.
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In this paper, we advance the hypothesis that the structure of legal institutions of a
country can also be important determinants of the amount of crimes committed by
politicians. It can therefore be interpreted as complementing the papers just cited
rather than as criticizing them. We thus argue that criminal behavior by politicians
and other public figures cannot only be explained by drawing on regulatory
policies (Ades and di Tella), on the level of economic development more
generally, on historical and cultural factors (Treisman), or on political institutions
– more precisely electoral institutions – (Persson et al., Golden and Chang). The
amount of corruption – or more broadly: criminal behavior by public figures – to
be expected is conjectured to depend on the way it is investigated and prosecuted.
It is thus hypothesized that the probability of prosecution of crimes committed by
government officials is an important determinant of the amount of crimes
committed by government officials. The expected utility of committing a crime is
assumed to depend on the probability of being punished as well as on the severity
of the punishment. Other factors determining the expected utility of committing a
crime are the probability of being investigated, publicized and prosecuted. In the
case of public figures and especially politicians, public investigations as such may
already reduce (expected) utility.
2.2 Definition of Key-Concepts
Corruption
The international NGO “Transparency International” defines corruption as “the
misuse of entrusted power for private benefit” (Transparency International 2000,
1). In this paper, we interpret “private benefit” as not confined to individual
benefit. Thus, corruption includes, for example, the possibility that entrusted
power is misused for entities such as political parties. In an early treatment of
corruption, Rose-Ackerman (1978) proposed to distinguish between legislative
and bureaucratic corruption, thus separating corruption committed by elected
politicians and by non-elected functionaries. The primary focus of this paper is on
the chances of criminal acts committed by members of the executive, the
legislature or other public figures being prosecuted. It is thus both narrower and
broader than the scope reflected in Rose-Ackerman’s approach. It is narrower in
that acts committed by low-level bureaucrats are not taken into account.4 This
narrower delineation was chosen because we are interested in the possibility of
                                                
4  As we assume that the interest of members of the executive in preventing the prosecution of low-
level bureaucrats is small.
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government members to prevent their own prosecution. Our interest is broader
than that of Rose-Ackerman as we are interested in every kind of crime.5
We assume that members of government have a central interest of not being
investigated, prosecuted, indicted, or convicted of a crime. Investigations may
already provoke an intense public debate and pre-condemnation in the media.
Public figures therefore have a great interest in suppressing any investigation. The
analysis is confined to influence within the legal framework. More heinous illegal
forms such as threatening the life of prosecutors or their families are not explicitly
analyzed.
Logically, influence on a single case can only be taken if there is some kind of
option space or discretion for the investigators and the procuracy. Even if there is
no such overt discretion, e.g. because the “mandatory principle” applies, there
may be “hidden” discretion, such as finding insufficient evidence or not
concentrating enough efforts to conduct serious investigations. Additionally,
influence may also be taken on individual members of the procuracy, e.g. by
taking away a case from a certain prosecutor.
Prosecution Agencies
Next, we need to define prosecution agencies. The public prosecutor’s office takes
on different names in different countries. Just to name a few: Crown Prosecution
Service, Public Attorney's Office, Department of Public Prosecution, Public
Prosecution Authority, Attorney General Office, State Attorney Office etc. For
simplicity, the generic term “procuracy” is used to include all of these. If one
thinks in terms of a value chain, the procuracy can be separated from the police,
on the one hand, and from the judiciary, on the other. The following criteria
should all be fulfilled in order to qualify as a procuracy: (i) it has the competence
to gather information on the behavior of criminal suspects, or to instruct the police
to gather more information; (ii) on the basis of that information it has the
competence to indict a suspect; (iii) during a trial it represents the interests of the
public.6
                                                
5  Our delineation further includes high party officials belonging to parties currently forming
government. For the moment, we exclude the possibility of an all party-cartel.
6  Empirically, investigative committees that are part of the legislature often inquire into executive
crimes during the course of duties. Their competences widely differ. In this paper, we refrain from
considering them because they are not part of the permanently established prosecution agency.
Their action depends on discretionary acts of parliament. Additionally, their focus is often restricted
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After having dealt with our key-terms, we now turn to present a number of
variables that determine possibilities and incentives of prosecutors to prosecute
crimes committed by public figures. These will henceforth be called
EXECRIMES. Attached to every variable is a hypothesis on the effects a
particular institutional arrangement is expected to have on the probability of
EXECRIMES being prosecuted.
3. Criteria for Comparing the Institutional Set up of Prosecution Agencies
3.1 Introductory Remarks
The main argument of this paper is that the institutional set up of prosecution
agencies is one central determinant for the probability of public figures being
prosecuted and, by derivation, for the level of corruption. We try to identify the
crucial institutional variables, which determine the incentives of the procuracy
concerning the question of indictment.
Institutional arrangements regarding six different issues are considered: the issue
whether the prosecution agency is subject to orders by members of the executive
(3.2), how influential members of the executive are in appointing, promoting, and
dismissing prosecutors (3.3), whether the prosecution agency enjoys the
monopoly to indict (3.4), how the discretion concerning the decision to prosecute
is institutionalized (3.5), whether the decisions of the prosecutors are subject to
judicial review (3.6), and finally, whether criminal charges can be brought against
prosecutors who do not follow the law in their prosecutorial activities (3.7).
3.2 Restrictions on Prosecution Due to Possible Government Interference
Prosecutors may be subjected to orders regarding individual cases they handle
which can be either internal or external. Whereas internal orders are instructions
by superiors within the prosecution agency, external orders include instructions
given by officials outside the procuracy, e.g., by the minister of justice.
Theoretically, a prosecution system can be structured such that each single
prosecutor enjoys the same kind of independence as a judge, who is not bound to
orders concerning factual or legal questions.
                                                                                                                                     
to crimes committed during the course of office or even more narrowly to breach of duty of office,
e.g. corruption, whereas our focus is, as just spelled out, broader.
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Hypothesis 1a: If the legal system provides for the possibility that members of the
executive can give direct orders to individual prosecutors, the probability of
EXECRIMES being prosecuted should be lower than otherwise, other variables
being equal.
Hypothesis 1b: If orders by members of the executive have to pass through the
head of the procuracy the effect is expected to be mitigated.7
The Power to Substitute a Prosecutor in Handling a Specific Case
A functional equivalent of the right to give orders is the right to substitute
prosecutors working on a specific case. This is functionally equivalent because it
endows the hierarchical superior giving orders to have his line of prosecution
carried out (or else having the case taken away). Nevertheless, substituting the
prosecutor might attract more public attention and criticism than instructions
given in camera to the prosecutor handling an investigation.
Hypothesis 1c: If the legal system provides for the possibility that members of the
executive have the right to reallocate prosecutors to specific cases, the probability
of EXECRIMES being prosecuted should be lower than otherwise, other variables
being equal..
3.3 Structural Restrictions on Prosecutorial Independence
If the career prospects of a prosecutor depend on the government, this might have
an impact on the probability of EXECRIMES being prosecuted. The
independence of prosecutors can be the result of various institutional
arrangements concerning the nomination, election and appointment procedures of
prosecutors as well as promotion and removal from office. We will distinguish
between the high level prosecutors, such as the state prosecutor, or general
prosecutor / attorney general, and the normal prosecutor as appointment/election
procedures may differ widely between the low-level prosecutors and the high
level ones. The appointment of the high level prosecutor is assumed to be decisive
as she normally disposes of an internal right of instruction.8
                                                
7  In some countries, external instructions can be given only to prosecute; instructions not to
prosecute are not allowed.
8  Appointment of low level prosecutors is usually done by the high level prosecutor or the minister
of justice. The decision is usually based on merits or grades. Due to the hierarchical structure of the
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Appointment
In determining the independence of the procuracy from the executive and
legislature, three aspects will be distinguished, namely (i) term length (ii)
renewability, and (iii) appointing organ. If terms are renewable, prosecutors can
be expected to cater to the interests of the organ that has the power to re-elect (or
to promote them to higher positions). Hence (hypothesis 2a), life-long tenure will
increase the independence of prosecutors which should increase the probability of
EXECRIMES being prosecuted.
Five basic modes of appointing high-level prosecutors can be distinguished:
(i) Direct election by citizen voters;
(ii) Election by the legislature or its subset;
(iii) Appointment by members of executive;
(iv) Appointment by members of the judiciary; and
(v) Appointment by members of the procuracy.9
(i) Direct election by the populace will most likely be connected with a limited
term.10 The threat of being voted out of office is to give the directly elected
prosecutors incentives to cater to the preferences of the populace at large.11
Whether this enhances the probability of EXECRIMES being prosecuted depends
on the importance that the populace at large attributes to these issues. If the
populace elects prosecutors on the communal, regional and/or state level, the
prosecution of political corruption would seem to enhance the popularity of
prosecutors.12 However, direct elections of prosecutors entail the danger of giving
them incentives to prosecute only those crimes that enhance their popularity and
to invest too many resources on them.13
                                                                                                                                     
procuracy, the appointment of low level prosecutors is of little influence for the probability of
EXECRIMES to be prosecuted, which allows us to neglect this point.
9  In addition there might be different methods of nominating prosecutors independently from the
appointing power, which may result with more than dozen combinations.
10  In Switzerland, prosecutors are elected, but never for a life term. The electorate varies across the
cantons: either the citizenry, the government, the parliament, or some kind of mixed system.
Prosecutors are seen to have a politically important job.
11  This is the case in the US, where a great majority of State prosecutors is elected and thus
responsible to the people, which is widely regarded as sufficient to control their power, Weigend
(2001).
12  This is the case in the US, see Weigend (1979), 592.
13  The question of election campaign contributions is also relevant, as these might be crucial for the
incentives of the directly elected prosecutors. Being a prosecutor in the US is often the stepping
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(ii) The consequences of having prosecutors appointed by the legislature depend
on the political institutions of a country. In parliamentary systems with plurality
voting (such as the British), it would not seem to make much of a difference if it is
the executive or the legislature that appoints. Both will result with low rates of
EXECRIMES. In systems with proportional representation and/or presidential
systems, it might very well make a difference, and appointment by the legislature
will not significantly lower the probability of EXECRIMES.
(iii) Appointment by members of the executive is expected to lead to a low
propensity to prosecute EXECRIMES - and a high probability of misusing the
procuracy against the opposition.
(iv) Appointment by the judiciary will lead to comparatively more independence
than appointment by the executive or the legislature. Other effects, such as the
propensity of the judiciary to appoint prosecutors that have a good reputation of
preparing excellent files will not be taken up here.
(v) Appointment by a body of prosecutors represents a classical system of co-
optation. Co-optation is expected to lead to a high degree of independence from
the executive.
Let us sum up in hypothesis 2b: appointment of prosecutors by the legislature, the
judiciary or the populace is expected to lead to a higher chance of EXECRIMES
being prosecuted than appointment by the executive itself. Although it is difficult
to establish a rank-order of prosecution probabilities for the remaining
institutional arrangements, it seems safe to argue that determination of career
prospects by fellow prosecutors or by the judiciary is more merit-based than the
other options. We would expect it to lead to quasi-optimal prosecution levels.
Promotion/Transfer of Prosecutors /Removal from Office
If members of the executive largely determine a prosecutor’s career, the behavior
of prosecutors towards members of the executive will be influenced due to this
institutional arrangement. Relevant aspects include (i) promotion, (ii) transfer, and
(iii) removal from office.
                                                                                                                                     
stone for taking a political job, such as governor. Prosecutors are normally party members and the
party organizes and finances the election campaign for the prosecutor, especially on the east coast
and in the cities. Political loyalties – and their consequences on prosecution of party members – are
therefore assumed to be a prerequisite of being reelected. See Weigend (1979, 593).
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(i) If representatives of public prosecutors need to consent to promotion, political
influence via the promotion process is expected to be lower than in countries
where (representatives of) prosecutors are not asked. Self-governing bodies of the
procuracy, which can decide on promotions are supposed to lead to the highest
independence.
(ii) The same argument applies to removal from office.14
(iii) Transfers to other offices (including in other cities) might be a device for
heavy pressure, if they can be carried out against the will of the prosecutor. This is
the reason why the principle of non-transferal against the will is often named as
part of the concept of judicial independence. Application of this principle to the
procuracy will make it less dependent on others.
Hypothesis 2c: the larger the influence of members of the executive on promotion,
removal and transfer of prosecutors, the lower the probability that EXECRIMES
will be prosecuted, other variables being equal.
3.4 Monopoly to Indict
If the procuracy enjoys a monopoly to prosecute crimes, economists would expect
a lower total number of prosecutions compared to institutional arrangements in
which prosecutorial activities are not confined to the procuracy. If there is a
monopoly, a politician who could be prosecuted has incentives to influence the
procuracy such that it refrains from prosecuting him, e.g. by offering bribes. If
other actors can also initiate a trial, it will be more difficult to prevent being
prosecuted. It is thus hypothesized ( hypothesis 3 ) that the chances of
EXECRIMES being prosecuted are lower in systems in which the procuracy
enjoys a monopoly of prosecution, other variables being equal.
There are various possibilities to institutionalize competition in prosecution: the
competence to indict can also be given to the police15, to interested private
parties16, to certain interest groups, such as child protection groups, environmental
groups, or tax payer associations. The latter avenue might be more effective in
combating corruption, since in many corruption cases there is no individual
                                                
14  If there is a high mobility between the prosecutor’s job and other jobs, such as the judiciary, we will
expect the prosecutor to be more independent.
15  As is, for example, the case in England and Norway.
16  E.g. to the victim (or her family) who might have the right to force public prosecution.
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victim; the victim is the public at large.17 Taking a case to court thus amounts to
the production of a public good. Interest groups can be assumed to be more likely
to contribute to its production than individuals.
3.5 Legal Limitations on the Discretion of Prosecutors
Mandatory versus Opportunity Principle
The legality principle – sometimes also called the principle of mandatory
prosecution - commands that every case in which there is enough evidence of an
offence having been committed has to be brought to court. The opportunity
principle, in contrast, grants a prosecutor some discretion concerning the
indictment decision given the same amount of evidence. We assume that the
opportunity principle confers more discretion to the procuracy than the legality
principle, as it allows broader justifications for non-prosecution of cases.18 From
this, hypothesis 4 is derived: Other things equal, prosecution of EXECRIMES is
expected to be higher under the mandatory principle than the opportunity
principle.
Indeterminate Legal Terms
De facto discretion also originates from the use of indeterminate legal terms such
as “sufficient evidence”, “initial evidence” or “convictability” as a prerequisite for
indictment or investigation. There clearly is a subjective element when the
chances of conviction by the court (or the jury) are the basis for pursuing a case.
The prosecutor may conceal what is in effect a discretionary dismissal behind the
label of insufficient evidence. She may argue that it would be impossible to prove
the suspect’s intent in court or to find sufficient evidence to convict the suspect.
The prediction of convictability in a jury system contains even more discretion as
it may depend on the perceived opinion of the jury on the case. In systems based
on a jury, the public opinion on EXECRIMES might be an important variable.
                                                
17  A similar solution is judicial review of the prosecutor’s decision to indict in which standing in such
proceeding is granted to interest groups. Such is the case in Israel, where even an NGO whose
purpose is to maintain the rule of law is granted standing in challenges to the prosecutorial
decisions.
18  Although this conceptual distinction is watertight, empirically one can observe that prosecutors
almost anywhere enjoy some degree of explicit discretion in their decision to indict (or not to
indict). In most legal systems, charges can be dismissed by the prosecutor on the basis of policy
considerations.
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The Discretion to Offer New Interpretation
Suppose the courts have established by precedent that a certain behavior  b is
punishable but that a prosecutor believes this to be wrong. If the procuracy does
have discretion on this issue, lower prosecution rate of EXECRIMES would be
expected given that the procuracy is not independent from the executive.
Summing up, prosecutors have most discretion if the opportunity principle is
combined with the possibility to re-interpret precedent. Given such a combination,
we would expect a low probability of EXECRIMES to be prosecuted if the
procuracy is part of the executive. Indeterminate legal terms might have an
additional effect. They will, however, not be taken up again, as it is almost
impossible to assess them empirically.
3.6 Judicial Review of Prosecution Decision
If the indictment decision of the procuracy is subject to judicial review, this can
have an effect on the probability of EXECRIMES being prosecuted given that the
judiciary is factually more independent than the procuracy. If this is the case,
judicial review is expected to decrease prosecutorial discretion, which, in turn, is
expected to increase the probability of EXECRIMES being prosecuted, other
variables being equal. (hypothesis 5). It might make a difference whether the
judiciary has the competence to review decisions not to prosecute or whether its
competence is confined to decisions to prosecute a case.
Judicial Review of the Decision Not to Prosecute
In many countries, the prosecutor’s decision (not) to start an investigation is not
subject to judicial review. The decision whether to prosecute, therefore, remains
within the procuracy. The same might also apply to the decision not to indict.
After indictment, the decision to stop the trial necessitates the consent of a judge
and/or of the accused in many countries.19 If there is no judicial review of the
decision not to indict, we expect the probability of EXECRIMES being
prosecuted to be lower than if there is judicial review.
                                                
19  In those countries where private prosecution may take place the prosecutor often has to end the
prosecution through a simple decision not to prosecute further which is usually not subject to
judicial review. Israel is one of the few exceptions where judicial review of decisions not to
prosecute (for any reason) is possible. If the case was dismissed due to insufficient evidence, there
is in some countries the possibility of an external request for judicial review, e.g. by the victim.
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Judicial Review of the Decision to Prosecute
In our context, judicial review of the decision to prosecute can play an important
role in cases where the prosecution went ahead with indictment, but is pushed by
political bodies to do so for fighting the opposition. If there is judicial review
before a trial is opened, the judge might act as a filter and thus dismiss cases,
which do not have legal or factual merits.
Judicial Power to Review the Charges
Some penal codes endow the procuracy with the competence to make a binding
decision on the charges brought against a suspect. This competence enhances
prosecuted discretion. It is the precondition for plea-bargaining as practiced in the
US.20 We hypothesize that in countries in which the procuracy has such a
monopoly, governments have MORE incentives to exert pressure before formal
procedures are begun.
3.7 Restrictions on Prosecutors’ Discretion through their exposure to
Criminal Charges
Making the prosecution of innocents, on the one hand, and the thwart/frustration
of prosecution, on the other, a punishable act raises the cost of unlawful behavior
of prosecutors. Possible exposure to prosecution may counterbalance the right of
instruction in specific cases as the prosecutor will have incentives to resist orders
which would make himself subject to criminal prosecution (hypothesis 6).
4 Some Hypotheses Concerning Interrelationships between Institutional
Variables
4.1 Introductory Remarks
The last section contained a number of isolated hypotheses concerning the likely
effects of different institutional arrangements of the six variables discussed.
Institutional arrangements do, however, never work in isolation. Their impacts
also depend on the institutional arrangements with regard to other variables. This
is the topic of this section. It is thus concerned with possible interaction effects
between different variables.
                                                
20  The bargain consisting in the suspect pleading guilty and in exchange being charged less.
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If each of the six variables discussed could only take on one of two forms, this
would already lead to 64 (2
6) possible combinations. It is impossible to discuss all
of them here. It is hence necessary to choose a subset. We believe that the first
two variables discussed, namely whether representatives of the executive have the
right to give instructions to the procuracy and the degree of formal independence
are of particular importance. We will thus discuss (i) possible interaction effects
between them, and (ii) possible interaction effects with the other four variables.
For reasons of illustration, we will, however, begin by spelling out the
institutional mix that is conjectured to lead to the lowest probability of
EXECRIMES being prosecuted.
We assume this probability to be lowest if (1) the executive has the right to give
instructions on individual cases (directly) and (2) formal independence in
appointment and career issues is low and (3) the procuracy enjoys the monopoly
of indictment and (4) the procuracy follows the opportunity (rather than the
mandatory) principle and (5) there is no judicial review of prosecutorial decisions,
and (6) no criminal charges can be brought against prosecutors in case they do not
act according to the law.
4.2 On the Relationship Between Right of Instructions and Formal
Independence
If the right to give instructions is combined with a low degree of formal
independence, we would expect a low probability of EXECRIMES being
prosecuted. The opposite also holds: if there is no right of instruction and the
procuracy enjoys a high degree of independence, a high probability of
EXECRIMES being prosecuted is to be expected. But what about the cases in
which right to give instructions and formal independence point in different
directions?
If prosecutors are formally independent, the effect of the right of members of the
executive to give instructions to prosecutors is expected to be less pronounced. It
is, of course, not expected to disappear entirely as non-compliance with
instructions will still have some negative effect on the utility of the prosecutor.
But the less severe the sanctions (for example because transferal against a
prosecutor’s will is impossible), the more pronounced is the counterbalancing
effect of formal independence expected to be.
The opposite would be that prosecutors enjoy only a low degree of formal
independence but that members of the executive do not have the (formal) right to
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give instructions. In such a case, the influence of the executive on particular cases
and their ability to reach specific results will supposedly not be as high as in the
reverse case. Yet, the general influence of the executive on the procuracy can be
expected to be even higher as the procuracy is only granted low levels of formal
independence.
4.3 On Interdependencies Between Rights to Instruct and Other Variables
We now shortly present some hypotheses regarding the interaction of the right to
give instructions with the other variables:
Hypothesis 7: A combination of the right to give instructions with a monopoly to
indict will reduce the probability of EXECRIMES being prosecuted even further
because this combination insures that nobody can get a court case against the will
of the procuracy – and the executive itself.
Hypothesis 8: A combination of the right to give instructions with a low amount
of discretion (i.e. the mandatory principle) can be expected to reduce the under-
prosecution of EXECRIMES. The duty to pursue a case can be interpreted as a
cost component to the prosecutor, which will make it less likely that she follows
the instructions received from the executive.
Hypothesis 9: A combination of the right to give instructions with judicial review
would mitigate the negative effects on the probability of prosecution if the
judiciary has the competence to act on cases in which the procuracy decided not to
prosecute.
Hypothesis 10: A combination of the right to give instructions with the possibility
of bringing criminal charges against prosecutors is supposed to have effects
similar to those spelled out in the last hypothesis. It can be expected to be less
influential as only very substantial misbehavior will be punishable.
Put differently, the negative effect of the right to give instructions can be
mitigated by giving other organs the competence to take cases to court, by having
the mandatory principle of prosecution, by granting judicial review even in cases
in which the prosecutors decide  not to investigate further, and by making the
prosecutors responsible on a personal basis for the level of criminal law.
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4.4 On Interdependencies Between Formal Independence and Other
Variables
We now turn to hypotheses regarding the interaction of formal independence with
the other variables.
Hypothesis 11: If the monopoly to indict is combined with a high degree of formal
independence, the probability of EXECRIMES being prosecuted is predicted to be
lower than if there were no such monopoly, other things being equal.
Hypothesis 12: A high degree of formal independence can lead to very different
outcomes: for some prosecutors, utility-maximization might consist in enjoying
life, for others in maximizing the number of cases prosecuted. If formal
independence is combined with the mandatory principle of prosecution, this does
not only decrease discretion, but it increases accountability and predictability.
Hypothesis 13: Much of what was just said with regard to mandatory prosecution
also applies to judicial review: it also increases accountability and predictability.
Hypothesis 14: The same can be expected if a high degree of formal independence
is combined with the possibility that prosecutors who do not follow the rules can
be charged with criminal penalties.
The four possible combinations shortly discussed give a very similar picture as
that discussed in 4.3: the (positive) effect of granting formal independence can be
further improved by giving other organs the competence to take cases to court, by
having the mandatory principle of prosecution, by granting judicial review even in
cases in which the prosecutors decide not to investigate further, and by making the
prosecutors responsible on a personal basis on the level of criminal law.
4.5 Additional Variables of Potential Relevance
The variables hitherto presented all focused on the institutional structure of the
procuracy. We now turn to some more general variables, which might also affect
the degree to which EXECRIMES are prosecuted.
Presidential systems often experience a legislative majority by a party that is not
identical to that of the President. In such cases, the legislative majority can be
expected to have strong incentives to prosecute crimes committed by the President
or his men. In order to do so, they will tend to establish a special prosecutor or the
like. We therefore expect EXECRIMES being prosecuted to a higher degree in
presidential than in parliamentary systems.
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Treisman (2000) finds that federal states have, c.p., higher corruption levels than
unitary states. We hypothesize that this does not only apply to corruption but can
be generalized to EXECRIMES given that the procuracy is organized on federal
lines, as is, e.g., the case in Germany and Switzerland. If our general argument is
correct, many prosecutors have incentives not to indict a member of the executive.
Such behavior might, however, be countered by the principle of mandatory
prosecution and the like. If, under these conditions, there is more than one state
procuracy which could potentially pick up the case, we are essentially dealing
with the volunteer’s dilemma: every prosecutor hopes that someone else in
another state will pick up the case. At the end, the case might no be picked up at
all.
The rate of prosecution of EXECRIMES might also be linked to the stability of
the government. This factor is thus not an institutional variable itself, but a
consequence of institutional variables. The more stable a government in a system
with a procuracy being part of the executive, the more we expect the procuracy to
be an instrument of fighting opposition, on the one hand, and we can expect a
lower rate of prosecution of EXECRIMES, on the other hand, in comparison to
countries in which there is a frequent change of government (all other components
being equal).
5 Conclusions and next steps
In this paper, we have generated some 20 hypotheses concerning the relationship
between the institutional structure of the procuracy in the system of separation of
powers as independent variables and the probability of EXECRIMES being
prosecuted as the dependent variable. The probability of EXECRIMES being
prosecuted is not measurable as such. But if the probability is low, then the
expected utility of committing such crimes is correspondingly high. Yet, measures
for government crimes that would lend themselves for international comparison
are not readily available. In empirically testing the hypotheses, we will thus resort
to corruption perception indices as published by Transparency International.
Although they are not exactly congruent with our notion of EXECRIMES, they
seem to be the best we can do.
It has been argued that high levels of corruption could undermine the trust of the
population in government. Low levels of trust could lead to a lower propensity to
invest and thus to negative economic consequences. But low levels of trust might
also decrease regime stability and lead to an increase in the resources that need to
be spent on police forces etc. These conjectures should also be tested empirically.
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